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ABSTRACT
In this work, we propose online traffic engineering as a novel
approach to detect and mitigate an emerging class of stealthy
Denial of Service (DoS) link-flooding attacks. Our approach
exploits the Software Defined Networking (SDN) paradigm,
which renders the management of network traffic more flex-
ible through centralised flow-level control and monitoring.
We implement a full prototype of our solution on an em-
ulated SDN environment using OpenFlow to interface with
the network devices. We further discuss useful insights gained
from our preliminary experiments as well as a number of
open research questions which constitute work in progress.
1. INTRODUCTION
Some of the most powerful DoS attacks ever, such as
the attack against Spamhaus which reached 400 Gbit/s [3],
have been observed during the last two years. Moreover,
new types of DoS link-flooding attacks have been re-
cently proposed; these attacks are extremely difficult to
mitigate and could potentially take entire countries off
the Internet [8, 11]. The Crossfire [8] attack in particu-
lar: i) uses legitimate rather than spoofed source IP ad-
dresses to send traffic; these addresses are much harder
to filter, ii) sends legitimate packets to publicly accessi-
ble servers, and iii) transmits low-bandwidth flows from
each bot individually; these “under-the-radar” flows then
cumulatively flood certain links in the network.
In this work, we introduce a novel approach to de-
tect Crossfire bots under adverse DoS conditions. The
key idea is to repeatedly change how traffic is routed
and to monitor sources that persistently react to re-
routing for the purpose of attacking a specific target. If
certain sources are recorded several times in links that
are DoS’ed they are considered suspicious and are fil-
tered. Therefore, our approach effectively increases the
cost for executing Crossfire. Traditionally, traffic engi-
neering is used solely for the purpose of load-balancing
DoS attacks. We use online traffic engineering both
to detect stealthy bots and to balance the load. Our
approach benefits from the following SDN principles:
i) centralised visibility and control for fast traffic engi-
neering, and ii) flow-level reactive traffic management.
2. METHODOLOGY
Attacker Model: The goal of the Crossfire [8] at-
tack is to cut-off Internet connectivity towards a specific
geographic area, the Target Area. Around the target
area, there are public servers, the Decoy Servers, and
network links, the Target Links, which lead to both the
target area and the decoy servers. The attacker first
constructs a map of the links (the link-map) in and
around the target area. Then, he floods certain target
links sending traffic only to the decoy servers. This way
the flood cannot be directly observed in the target area,
but it still isolates this area from the rest of the network.
For this purpose, the attacker finds the target links that
are used most along the bot-to-decoy server and bot-to-
target area paths and he coordinates his bots to attack
them. Finally, the attacker monitors the network routes
and reacts to changes (which are possible defender’s ac-
tions) by setting up the attack again, i.e., updating the
link-map and recalculating the target links.
Defender Model: The goal of the defender is to
keep the network running without any severe conges-
tion and to find and rate-limit malicious traffic sources.
Therefore, the defender: i) monitors traffic load on
his network and detects DoS’ed links that are severely
congested, ii) balances traffic load by rerouting traf-
fic destined to different destinations (including the tar-
get area, decoy servers, etc), without knowing the at-
tacker’s classification, and iii) records sources observed
in DoS’ed links to detect suspicious recurring sources.
Attacker - Defender Interplay: Malicious Cross-
fire bots will change their decoy server selection in case
the rerouting has diverted their load from the targeted
link(s), as shown in the example of Figure 1. Therefore,
the same bots will “return to the crime-scene” and be
present in another DoS event. The defender records the
sources that appear in DoS’ed links. In addition, he
records sources that he re-routes “away” of such links
for load balancing. Sources that are pushed away, but
return to future DoS’ed links (by selecting a new de-
coy server) are particularly suspicious. Thus after each
attacker-defender interaction, malicious sources become
more identifiable. Sources that surpass a threshold of
1
12
DoS
Target 
Link
Legitimate traffic
Rerouted 
legitimate traffic
Attack traffic
Rerouted 
attack traffic
Crossfire Attack Defender Rerouting Attacker Reaction
1
2
Target 
Link 1
2
Target 
Link
DoS
Decoy Servers
Target Area
Figure 1: Attacker - Defender interplay: 1) Attacker floods target link, 2) Defender reroutes traffic
destined to decoy server 2 to mitigate the attack, 3) Attacker updates selected decoy servers sending
more traffic to decoy server 1. Traffic sources returning to the target link are deemed suspicious.
suspiciousness can be rate-limited. In contrast, benign
flash-crowd load does not re-adjust to routing changes,
but it uses the same popular destination(s) as before.
A key challenge for the defender is that he has no
information about how the network nodes are mapped
to the target area and the decoy servers. Therefore, he
can select different re-routing strategies to optimise the
detection phase: e.g., using random destinations or pre-
ferring servers that occupy homogeneous bandwidth on
the congested links. The former strategy is simpler but
might need more rounds to lead to detection. The latter
strategy is a crude way of “approximating” the decoy
server groups, since the attacker generally distributes
traffic to those evenly for load-balancing.
Parameter Space: In our model, the attacker and
the defender are continuously engaged into two co-depe-
ndent loops consisting of the following steps: 1) cen-
tralised flow monitoring [4]; 2) consolidation of mea-
surement data and decision for next action; 3) network
control and bot orchestration. The interactions between
the two players determine if and when one of them has
an advantage. Numerous parameters can influence the
outcome, namely: i) network topology and link capac-
ities, ii) attack flow rate per bot, iii) bot and flow as-
signment strategy for attacker, iv) link-map and link-
bandwidth measurement intervals for both the attacker
and the defender, v) rerouting strategy for the defender,
vi) DoS’ed link detection approach and thresholds, and
vii) suspiciousness threshold for rate-limiting decisions.
Proof-of-Concept Implementation: To better un-
derstand the parameter space and the parameterization
trade-offs, we have implemented a full prototype of the
attacker and the defender on the Mininet emulation en-
vironment [9]. Emulated bots periodically use tracer-
oute towards the target area and the decoy servers to
build and maintain the link-map. They flood the target
links using low-bandwidth HTTP GET requests to the
decoy servers. On the defender’s side, we use the POX
OpenFlow controller [2] for prototyping our online traf-
fic engineering approach. We also employ OpenFlow [1]
capabilities for network monitoring, in order to have a
unified management solution. More implementation de-
tails of our emulation setup can be found in [7].
Preliminary Results and Insights: We evaluate
the feasibility of our approach using a custom topology
as described in [7]. Early results show that our SDN-
based solution reacts in comparable time scales (some
seconds) as the attack setup stage. Since the attacker
needs approx. equal time to identify and react to de-
fender’s re-routing and counter-measures, the attack is
effective for ∼50% of the total time. Moreover, a key
insight is that links that are DoS’ed in parallel need
to be handled in batches to avoid routing oscillations
during mitigation; this mandates a tunable delay in
the defender’s action loop. We further note that the
OpenFlow-based control functions run in sub-second
times; monitoring is the dominant time component.
3. SUMMARY AND OPEN QUESTIONS
In this work, we proposed using dynamic traffic en-
gineering in a novel way to detect and counter the par-
ticularly stealthy Crossfire attack. In contrast to the
CoDef [10] approach which assumes a collaborative en-
vironment, we assume a hostile setup. The approach
raises a number of research questions: i) What is the
trade-off between detection accuracy, topology and traf-
fic characteristics, and re-routing strategy? How can
we re-route traffic to accelerate detection and minimise
false positives? ii) What is the trade-off between rerout-
ing costs (including possible instabilities) and DoS costs?
iii) What are the temporal aspects of the attacker and
defender control loops and their dependencies on dif-
ferent parameters? iv) How to extend the mitigation
methodology to the inter-domain level involving sup-
port from upstream providers, who run the algorithm
“as-a-Service”? v) How to scale up source recording us-
ing bloom filters and/or prefix aggregation? Other fu-
ture research topics include understanding the interplay
between fast rerouting and TCP congestion control [6],
as well as the interaction with classic routing policies [5].
Lastly, we are interested in the game-theoretic mod-
elling of the interaction between the players.
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